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We develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term,
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volatility. In such a situation, a central bank can implement the constrained eﬃcient
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Introduction

Interbank markets are among the most important in the financial system. They allow liquidity to be readily transferred from banks with a surplus to banks with a deficit. They are
the focus of central banks’ implementation of monetary policy and have a significant eﬀect
on the whole economy. Under normal circumstances the interbank markets, especially the
short term ones, work rather well. On occasion, however, such as in the crisis that started
in the summer of 2007, interbank markets stop functioning well inducing central banks to
intervene massively in order to try to restore normal conditions.
Despite their apparent importance, interbank markets have received relatively little attention in the academic literature. The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple theoretical
framework for analyzing interbank markets and how the central bank should intervene. Our
analysis is based on a standard banking model developed in Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b)
and Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008). There are two periods in the usual way. Banks can
hold one-period liquid assets or two-period long term assets with a higher return. All assets
are risk free in the sense that their promised payoﬀs are always paid. Banks face uncertain
liquidity demands from their customers at the end of the first period. We distinguish between two types of uncertainty concerning banks’ liquidity needs. The first is idiosyncratic
uncertainty that arises from the fact that for any given level of aggregate demand for liquidity there is uncertainty about which banks will face the demand. The basic role of interbank
markets is to allow reallocations of liquidity from banks with an excess to banks with a
deficit. The second is the aggregate uncertainty that is due to the fact that the overall level
of the demand for liquidity that banks face is stochastic.
We start with the analysis of the optimal portfolio of assets and payments that a planner
who can transfer liquidity costlessly would implement. The planner is constrained in the
same way as banks to oﬀer deposit contracts where the payment at the end of the first
period cannot be made contingent on the aggregate demand for liquidity in the banking
system or the bank’s individual liquidity demand. The resulting optimal allocation is termed
1

the constrained eﬃcient allocation because of this constraint to use deposit contracts.
We next consider the operation of an interbank market where banks can buy and sell
the long term asset at the end of the first period. Since all assets are risk free in our model,
there is no diﬀerence between selling the long asset and using it as collateral in a repurchase
agreement. For ease of exposition, we consider outright sales of assets. The interbank
market allows reallocations of liquidity between banks that depend on the realizations of the
idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks. We focus on situations where the uncertainty
concerning liquidity demand is not suﬃcient to cause banks to fail. In other words, banks find
it optimal to keep enough liquidity to insure themselves against the high aggregate liquidity
shock. The aggregate uncertainty about liquidity demand leads to volatile equilibrium prices
for the long asset at the end of the first period, or equivalently interest rates. The intuition
hinges on the simple fact that prices in the interbank market have to adjust to satisfy the
market clearing condition and to provide banks with the appropriate incentives to keep the
necessary liquidity initially. When the aggregate liquidity demand turns out to be low (that
is, in the good state), there is an excess supply of aggregate liquidity at the end of the first
period. The price of the long term asset is bid up to the level where the return during the
second period is the same for both assets so that banks will be willing to hold both of them.
The high price in the good state implies that prices have to fall in the bad state, that is when
the high aggregate liquidity shock is realized, in order for banks to be willing to hold both
the short and the long term assets initially. If this was not the case, the long asset would
dominate the short asset and banks would not hold any liquidity to start with. Given that
consumers are risk averse, this price volatility is ineﬃcient because it leads to consumption
volatility thus preventing the implementation of the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
The main result of the paper is to show that the introduction of a central bank that
engages in open market operations to fix the price of the long asset at the end of the first
period (or equivalently fix the short term interest rate) removes the ineﬃciency associated
with a lack of hedging opportunities. This intervention allows the banks to implement the
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constrained eﬃcient allocation.
To see how this occurs it is helpful to consider two special cases. The first is where there
is just idiosyncratic liquidity risk and no aggregate risk. Provided the central bank engages
in the right open market operations and fixes the price in the interbank market at the end
of the first period at the appropriate level, banks with a high liquidity demand will be able
to sell their holdings of the long term asset to raise liquidity. The banks with low liquidity
demand at the end of the first period are happy to buy the long asset and provide liquidity
to the market because they need payoﬀs at the end of the second period to meet their needs
then. The second special case is where there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty but there is
aggregate uncertainty about liquidity demand. Here the central bank must fix the price by
engaging in open market operations. In particular, it needs to remove excess liquidity from
the banks by selling the long asset when aggregate liquidity demand is low. It can do this
by selling government securities that replicate the long asset that are funded through lump
sum taxes on late consumers at the final date. The optimal intervention by the central bank
when there is both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty combines the two policies in the
special cases. The central bank must fix the price at the appropriate level that allows banks
to reallocate liquidity from those with low idiosyncratic shocks to those with high ones. At
the same time it must use open market operations to control the aggregate liquidity in the
market to fix the price. We show that achieving both objectives simultaneously is possible
and the constrained eﬃcient allocation can be implemented. This result is in line with
the argument of Goodfriend and King (1988) that open market operations are suﬃcient to
address pure liquidity risk on the interbank market.
One of the implications of our model is that even when the constrained eﬃcient allocation
is being implemented by the policies of the central bank, an increase in aggregate uncertainty
can cause banks to stop using the interbank markets to trade with each other. The banks
hoard liquidity because they may need it to meet high aggregate demand. When aggregate
demand is low, however, they have enough liquidity to deal with variations in idiosyncratic

3

demand and as a result the banks stop trading with each other. At least in the context of
the model considered here, this cessation of trade does not have consequences on the banks’
ability to remain active. There is no need for central banks to intervene since the liquidity
hoarding is consistent with constrained eﬃciency.
The basic problem in our model that leads to a need for central bank intervention is that
financial markets are incomplete. In particular, banks are unable to hedge the idiosyncratic
and aggregate liquidity shocks that they face. We consider how complete markets would
operate and allow these risks to be hedged. There are many forms that such complete
markets could take. We consider how markets for Arrow securities where all trades are made
at the initial date allow the constrained eﬃcient allocation to be implemented. This involves
a large number of securities being issued and traded. In practice, the costs of issuance and
of the infrastructure for trading securities to implement this would be prohibitive.
Finally, we consider the multi-period case. Instead of three dates there is now an infinite
horizon. We show how central bank intervention combined with a tax and transfer scheme
can implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation for the tractable case of idiosyncratic risk.
A number of other papers focus on ineﬃciencies due to the incompleteness of interbank
markets. Freixas et al. (2009) assume that there are two possible distributions of idiosyncratic shocks across the banking system. This leads to a multiplicity of equilibria. Their
main result is to show that the government can implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation
by setting interest rates that depend on the pattern of idiosyncratic risk shocks. Allen and
Gale (2000) show how incompleteness in links between banks in the interbank markets can
lead to contagion.
In addition to the incompleteness of markets that we focus on, asymmetric information,
monopoly power, and various other imperfections can lead to problems in interbank markets.
Heider et al. (2008) focus on the credit risk problem that asymmetric information introduces
when a bank’s probability of default cannot be directly observed by outsiders. If the problem
is small there is full participation. If credit risk is significant for some banks and this is
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reflected in a higher interest rate for all banks, safer borrowers drop out of the market.
When the adverse selection problem is severe the market breaks down either because lenders
prefer to hold on to their funds or because borrowers find it too expensive to borrow. Other
analyses of problems in the interbank market arising from asymmetric information of various
kinds include Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Flannery (1996), and Freixas and Jorge (2008).
Acharya et al. (2008) model the interbank markets as being characterized in times of
crisis by moral hazard, asymmetric information, and monopoly power. In their model, a bank
with surplus liquidity is able to bargain with a bank that needs liquidity to keep funding
projects and is able to extract all the surplus. The authors provide a number of historical
examples where some banks had monopoly power over others during a crisis. Repullo (2005)
considers the poor functioning of interbank markets due to banks’ free riding on central bank
liquidity. Other papers where markets for liquidation do not work properly or are absent
and some form of government intervention may improve eﬃciency are Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998), Gorton and Huang (2004, 2006), Diamond and Rajan (2005, 2008), and Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The constrained eﬃcient
allocation is derived in Section 3. We then consider the operation of an interbank market
for the long asset in Section 4. The role of the central bank is analyzed in Section 5. Section
6 considers how complete markets would implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation. A
multi-period version of the model is presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

2

The model

The model is based on Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b) and Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008).
There are three dates  = 0 1 2 and a single good that can be used for consumption or
investment at each date. The banking sector consists of a large number of competitive
institutions.
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There are two securities, one short and one long. Both are risk free. The short security
is represented by a storage technology: one unit at date  produces one unit at date  + 1.
The long security is a simple constant-returns-to-scale investment technology that takes two
periods to mature: one unit invested in the long security at date 0 produces   1 units of
the good at date 2 so it is more productive than the short security.
We assume there is a market for liquidating the long asset at date 1. Each unit can be
sold for  . Participation in this market is limited: financial institutions such as banks can
buy and sell in the asset market at date 1 but individual consumers cannot.
Banks raise funds from depositors, who have an endowment of one unit of the good
at date 0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncertain about their preferences:
with probability  they are early consumers, who only value the good at date 1, and with
probability 1 −  they are late consumers, who only value the good at date 2. There are two
types of uncertainty that determine :

 =  + 

where    =   is an idiosyncratic bank-specific shock and  = 0 1 is an aggregate shock.
Except where otherwise stated we assume   0 For simplicity, we assume that the random
variables  and  have two-point supports. That is:
 = ̄ +  w. pr. 12 
 = ̄ −  w. pr. 12 
where 0   ≤   1; and
⎧
⎪
⎨ 0 w. pr. 
=
⎪
⎩ 1 w. pr. (1 − )

where 0    1. Because there are only two values of  the price at which the long asset
can be sold at date 1 takes at most two values,   where  = 0 1.
6

Uncertainty about time preferences generates a preference for liquidity and a role for the
intermediary as a provider of liquidity insurance. The utility of consumption is represented
by a utility function () with the usual properties. Expected utility at date 0 is given by

 =  [ (1 ) + (1 −  )(2 )] 
where  denotes consumption at date  = 1 2
Banks compete by oﬀering deposit contracts to consumers in exchange for their endowments and consumers respond by choosing the most attractive of the contracts oﬀered. Free
entry ensures that banks oﬀer deposit contracts that maximize consumers’ welfare and earn
zero profits in equilibrium. Otherwise, a bank could enter and make a positive profit by
oﬀering a more attractive contract.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that consumers deposit their entire endowment
in a bank at date 0 since the bank can do anything the consumers can do. The bank invests
 units per capita in the short asset and 1 −  units per capita in the long asset and oﬀers
each consumer a deposit contract, which allows the consumer to withdraw either  units at
date 1 or the residue of the bank’s assets at date 2 divided equally among the remaining
depositors.
A consumer’s type is private information. An early consumer cannot misrepresent his
type because he needs to consume at date 1; but a late consumer can claim to be an early
consumer, withdraw  at date 1, store it until date 2 and then consume it. The deposit
contract is incentive compatible if and only if the residual payment to late consumers at date
2 is at least . Since the late consumers are residual claimants at date 2, it is possible to
give them at least  units of consumption if and only if

 + (1 − )


≤  +  (1 − )


(1)

The left hand side is a lower bound for the present value of consumption at date 1 when
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early consumers are given  and late consumers are given at least . The first term is the
consumption given to the early consumers. The second term is the present value of the
(1 − ) given to the late consumers. The price of the long asset at date 1 is  and this
long asset pays oﬀ  at date 2 so the date 1 present value of 1 unit of consumption at date
2 is  . The right hand side is the value of the bank’s portfolio. The bank has  in the
short asset and (1 − ) of the long asset worth  per unit. Thus, condition (1) is necessary
and suﬃcient for the deposit contract  to satisfy incentive compatibility and the budget
constraint simultaneously. If (1) was not satisfied the late consumers would receive less than
the early consumers if they left their funds in the bank so they would find it optimal to
withdraw and there would be a run. The inequality in (1) is referred to as the incentive
constraint for short. We restrict our analysis to the set of parameters where this constraint
is satisfied for the optimal contract. We also assume that bank runs do not occur when the
constraint is satisfied. In other words, late consumers will withdraw at date 2 as long as
the bank can satisfy the incentive constraint.
All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1. In particular, depositors learn
whether they are early or late consumers and the values of  and  are determined. While
each depositor’s individual realization of liquidity demand is observed only by them,  and
 are publicly observed.

3

The constrained eﬃcient allocation

The planner invests in a portfolio of the short and long asset. The proceeds are distributed
directly to early and late consumers. The planner does not need to worry about idiosyncratic
liquidity risk since the  group with  early consumers will be balanced by the  group
with  early consumers. It is possible to just plan for ̄ early consumers in total.
The planner provides early consumers with consumption  and late consumers receive
20 when  = 0 and 21 when  = 1. Using the notation 0 = ̄ and 1 = ̄ +  the planner’s
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problem can be written

max
 

 [0 () + (1 − 0 )(20 )] + (1 − ) [1 () + (1 − 1 )(21 )]
0  ≤ 
(1 − 0 )20 =  − 0  + (1 − )

s.t.

(2)

1  ≤ 
(1 − 1 )21 =  − 1  + (1 − )
0 ≤  0 ≤  ≤ 1

The first two constraints represent the physical constraints on consumption at the two
dates in state  = 0. At date 1 it is not possible to consume more output than exists. At date
2 the (1 − 0 ) late consumers consume 20  The total amount available for them is whatever
is not consumed at date 1,  − 0  together with what is produced at date 2 (1 − )
Similarly for the next two constraints for state  = 1 Finally, we have the usual constraints
on  and 
We denote the optimal solution to this problem  ∗ and ∗  Note that it cannot be the
case at the optimum that  ∗  1 ∗  If this inequality held, it would be possible to increase
expected utility by holding  constant and reducing  since   1 Hence at the optimum

 ∗ = 1 ∗ = (̄ + )∗  0 ∗ 

(3)

Thus the planner’s problem is to choose  to
h
i
h
i
+(1−1 )
(1−1 )
max  0 () + (1 − 0 )( 1−0 ) + (1 − ) 1 () + (1 − 1 )( 1−1 ) 
This gives the first order condition that determines ∗ as
¸
∙
¸
∙
∗
∗
∗
0 ∗
0  + (1 − 1  )
0 ∗
0 (1 − 1  )
)( − 1 ) +(1−) 1  ( ) +  (
)(−1 ) = 0
 0  ( ) +  (
1 − 0
1 − 1
(4)
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Diﬀerentiating a second time with respect to  it can be easily checked that the second
derivative is negative since 00  0 Thus the constrained eﬃcient allocation is unique.
We turn next to consider the allocation when there is an interbank market at date 1 that
allows banks to buy and sell the long asset.

4

Interbank markets

Suppose there is an interbank market at date 1 for trading the long asset at price   Banks
can buy the long and short assets at date 0 for a price of 1 and at date 1 it is also possible
to buy the short asset at a price of 1. This set of markets is incomplete in that it is not
possible to completely hedge the risk of aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. It is
shown that this incompleteness leads to price volatility.
Once the banks have received the funds of depositors at date 0 they can use them to
obtain the two assets. In addition to choosing their portfolio of  in the safe asset and 1 − 
in the long asset at date 0, they must also set the amount  that depositors can withdraw at
date 1. When they know the level of aggregate liquidity demand and their own idiosyncratic
liquidity shock at date 1 they can use the interbank market to buy or sell the long asset.
The consumption of a bank’s depositors at date 2 depends on the aggregate state since
this determines   It also depends on the idiosyncratic shock that strikes the bank since
this determines the proportions  of early and 1 −  of late consumers. In particular, for 
and  such that the incentive constraint (1) is satisfied so bankruptcy is avoided

2 =

h
1−+

− 


1 − 

i




(5)

for  = 0 1 and  =   The term in square brackets represents the amount of long asset
held by the bank at date 2. The (1−) term is the initial holding of the long asset purchased
at date 0 If  −    0 then excess liquidity at date 1 can be used to purchase the long
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asset. The amount of the long asset that can be purchased is ( −  )  If  −    0
then it is necessary to sell the long asset held by the bank in the market at date 1 to fund
the shortfall of liquidity. In this case ( −  ) represents the amount that must be sold.
Each unit of the long asset pays oﬀ  and the total payoﬀ must be split between the (1− )
late consumers.
The problem each bank solves at date 0 is to choose  and  to

max

1
{[0 ()
2

+ (1 − 0 )(20 ) + 0 () + (1 − 0 )(20 )]

+(1 − )[1 () + (1 − 1 )(21 ) + 1 () + (1 − 1 )(21 )]}
s.t.

(6)

0 ≤  0 ≤  ≤ 1

taking prices 0 and 1 as given. The first order conditions for this with respect to the
choice of  and  are:



µ

¶
µ
¶
1
1
0
0
− 1 [ (20 ) +  (20 )] + (1 − )
− 1 [0 (21 ) + 0 (21 )] = 0
0
1

(7)

1 
[̄ + (1 − )]0 () − [ ( 0 (20 ) +  0 (20 ))
2 0
+

1−
(( + )0 (21 ) + ( + )0 (21 ))] = 0
1

(8)

Now since the aggregate measure of banks is 1 the aggregate amount of liquidity is .
There are two aggregate states of demand for liquidity,  = 0 where 0 = ̄ and  = 1 where
1 = ̄ + . Within each of these states, half of the banks have high idiosyncratic demand,
  for liquidity In this case they can liquidate part of their holdings of the long asset in
the interbank market to meet the high demand for liquidity from their customers. The other
half of the banks have low liquidity demand,   They are willing to use their excess liquidity
to buy the long asset in the interbank market. Since, we are assuming bankruptcy is not
optimal, we know that the aggregate amount of liquidity  must be suﬃcient to cover demand
in state  = 1 so we have  ≥ 1  = (̄ + ) Since   0 this implies that   0  = ̄ As
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a result there is excess liquidity at date 1 in state  = 0 In order for the interbank market
to clear it is necessary that
0 = 

(9)

In this case banks are willing to hold both the long asset and the excess liquidity between
dates 1 and 2. If 0   they will be willing to hold only the long asset while if 0  
they will be willing to hold only the short asset. Hence 0 must be given by (9).
Notice that if   (̄ + ) a similar argument would hold for state  = 1 and we would
have 1 =   But this cannot be an equilibrium given 0 =  because then the long asset
would dominate the short asset between dates 0 and 1 and there would be no investment in
the short asset at all Hence equilibrium requires

 = 1  = (̄ + )

(10)

It then follows that 1 must be such that banks are willing to hold both the long and
short asset between dates 0 and 1. To find the equilibrium value of 1 we substitute for 0
and  using (9) and (10) and solve the first order conditions (7) and (8) for 1 and . Note
that it must be the case that 1  1 otherwise the long asset would dominate the short asset.
The prices 0 and 1 ensure that the banks are willing to hold both the long and the short
asset between dates 0 and 1 Price volatility is necessary to provide the correct incentives in
both periods.
One issue concerns the circumstances under which banks will stop trading with each other
in the interbank market. The essential purpose of the interbank market is to allow banks
with high liquidity needs to sell the long asset and obtain liquidity from banks with low
liquidity needs. If the amount of liquidity the banks hold to deal with aggregate uncertainty
is large enough then in state  = 0 when aggregate liquidity demand is low, they may not
need to go to the interbank market to raise liquidity since they hold so much internally
anyway. In particular, they will not need to enter the market in state  = 0 when they
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are an  bank if 1   0  Using 1 = ̄ +  and 0 = ̄ +  it can be seen that this
simplifies to
  
Thus banks will stop trading with each other if aggregate uncertainty is large enough relative
to idiosyncratic uncertainty.

5

Central bank intervention

In this section we introduce a central bank that can engage in open market operations.
In practice central banks hold large portfolios of securities that they use to intervene in the
markets. They buy or sell securities to aﬀect the amount of liquidity held by banks. In recent
years the focus of most central banks has been to use open market operations to target the
interest rate in the overnight interbank market. In order to explain how the central bank
can implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation, we proceed in three steps. The first is to
show how this can be done when there is only idiosyncratic risk. The second is to show how
open market operations can be used when there is just aggregate risk. Finally, we consider
the two types of risk together.

5.1

Idiosyncratic liquidity risk alone:   0  = 0

We start with the simplest case where there is only idiosyncratic risk in liquidity demand,
and no aggregate risk so   0  = 0. We show that by holding an appropriate portfolio
of securities and engaging in open market operations and fixing the price of the long asset
at  = 1, the central bank can ensure that the constrained eﬃcient allocation  ∗  ∗  and ∗2
can be implemented.
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty we know that it is eﬃcient to use the short asset
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to provide early consumption and the long asset to provide late consumption so

 ∗ = ̄∗ = ∗ ; ∗2 =

(1 −  ∗ )

1−

Our approach is to show that the banks can provide their depositors with this allocation
provided the central bank adopts the optimal policy.
Let 0 denote the lump sum tax that is imposed by the government at date 0 to fund
the portfolio for open market operations of the central bank. The central bank uses these
funds to buy the short term asset at date 0. Depositors then have 1 − 0 remaining that
they put in the banks. Suppose the banks hold  ∗ − 0 in the short asset and 1 −  ∗ in the
long asset between dates 0 and 1.
At date 1, half the banks have  = ̄ +  early consumers while the other half have
 = ̄ −  Banks of type   =   require total liquidity of  ∗  They have liquidity
 ∗ − 0 so their net need is  ∗ − 0 −  ∗  If this is positive they use it to buy the long term
asset. If it is negative they sell the long term asset to raise the needed liquidity. The central
bank sets  = 1 and supplies its holding of the short asset 0 to the market and receives
0 of the long asset. The interbank market clears since
1
1 ∗
( − 0 −  ∗ ) + ( ∗ − 0 −  ∗ ) + 0 =  ∗ − ̄∗ = 0
2
2
A bank of type  now has 1 −  ∗ +  ∗ − 0 −  ∗ = 1 − 0 −  ∗ in the long asset. At
date 2 these holdings allow the banks to provide a payout to their late consumers of

 2 =

(1 − 0 −  ∗ )

1 − 

At date 2, the central bank has 0 . These funds are remitted to the government and
the government then distributes them as a lump sum grant to all the 1 −  late consumers
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of
2 =

0 

1−

In order to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation, it is necessary that the sum of
these payouts is equal to ∗2  Thus we need

 2 +  2 =

(1 − 0 −  ∗ )
0 
(1 −  ∗ )
= ∗2 =

+
1 − 
1−
1−

It can easily be checked that
0 = 1 − ∗
solves this equation for any value of  since  ∗ = ∗  The central bank policy described
allows banks to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation. By holding a portfolio of
1 − ∗ of the short asset and setting  = 1 the central bank eﬀectively allows the banks
to be indiﬀerent to having early or late consumers. They give early consumers ∗ and late
consumers
 2 =

(1 − 0 −  ∗ )
= ∗ 
1 − 

The present value of the payments to early and late consumers is the same so that the size
of a bank’s idiosyncratic shock becomes irrelevant. It can be demonstrated that  ∗ and ∗
maximize the expected utility of the bank’s depositors subject to the usual constraints by
checking the first order conditions. Since this is the best feasible allocation, it is individually
optimal for each bank to choose this. Note also that we have demonstrated the optimality
of central bank intervention for two groups  and  but it is clear that the same result will
hold for an arbitrary distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
In the discussion so far, we have used the terminology that 0 = 1 − ∗ is a lump sum
tax that finances the central bank’s holdings of the short asset from date 0 to date 1. The
central bank uses these holdings to purchase the long asset and holds it between date 1 and
date 2. At date 2 the payoﬀs from this long asset are paid to the government and they are
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used to finance a lump sum grant to late consumers. This terminology presumes ∗  1
This will be the case if, for example, constant relative risk aversion is suﬃciently below 1.
However, if, for example, constant relative risk aversion is suﬃciently above 1, then ∗  1
In this case all the signs are reversed. Instead of a lump sum tax, 0 represents a lump sum
grant of an asset that replicates the short asset. In other words, the asset is “money”. The
central bank has a liability rather than an asset at date 0. At date 1 the central bank sells
an asset that replicates the long asset to remove the money from the banking system. At
date 2 there is a lump sum tax to make the payment on the government asset replicating
the long asset. Thus the theory presented provides a rich model of central bank intervention
in the interbank markets.

5.2

Aggregate liquidity risk alone:  = 0   0

Next consider what happens with no idiosyncratic risk but with positive aggregate risk In
this case the constrained eﬃcient allocation can be implemented by having the central bank
engage in open market operations to fix 0 = 1 = 1
Let  ∗  ∗  and ∗2 denote the allocation. We know from Section 3 that
 ∗ = 1 ∗ = (0 + )∗ 
∗

(11)
∗

∗

∗

 − 0  + (1 −  )
 + (1 −  )
=

1 − 0
1 − 0
(1 −  ∗ )
=

1 − 1

∗20 =
∗21

∗

(12)
(13)

As usual we show that it is feasible for the banks to implement the constrained eﬃcient
allocation. Given that this provides the highest level of expected utility that is feasible, then
it will be optimal for them to do so.
At date 0 the banks hold  ∗ of the short asset and 1 −  ∗ of the long asset.
At date 1 in state  = 0 the central bank needs to drain liquidity to ensure 0 = 1 The
government issues 1 = ∗ of debt at date 1 that pays  at date 2. Thus the total owed by
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the government on its debt at date 2 is ∗  The debt is given to the central bank at date 1
to allow it to conduct open market operations. The central bank sells the government debt,
which is equivalent to the long asset, for 0 = 1 This removes the excess liquidity from the
market and prevents the price of the long asset being bid up to 0 =  The central bank
holds the liquidity of ∗ that it acquires until date 2.
After the central bank’s open market operations, the banks own 1 −  ∗ + ∗ of the long
asset. At date 2 this allows them to pay to each of their 1 − 0 late consumers
 20 =

(1 −  ∗ + ∗ )

1 − 0

The central bank ends up at date 2 with 1 = ∗ of the short asset. The proceeds from
these assets are assumed to be returned to the government. The government has resources
of ∗ and owes ∗  on its long term debt so it needs to impose a lump sum tax on each of
the 1 − 0 late consumers of
 20 =

∗ (1 − )

1 − 0

Hence late consumers receive

 20 +  20 =

∗ + (1 −  ∗ )
= ∗20
1 − 0

as required to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
In state  = 1 each bank pays ∗ to 1 early consumers at date 1. This implies that
the banks have no short asset but only 1 −  ∗ of the long asset after this. The central bank
announces that it is setting 1 = 1 but does not need to actively conduct open market
operations to ensure this. Each bank pays (1 −  ∗ ) to the 1 − 1 late consumers so each
receives a payoﬀ of
 21 =

(1 −  ∗ )
= ∗21 
1 − 1

This demonstrates that the banks can implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation in
17

the case of aggregate liquidity shocks given the open market operations of the central bank
described. It can again be shown that  ∗ and ∗ satisfy each bank’s optimization problem.
Since this allocation gives the highest expected utility that is feasible it is optimal for the
banks to implement it.

5.3

Idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity risk:   0   0

We continue to denote the constrained eﬃcient allocation  ∗  ∗  and ∗2 as in (11)-(13).
With both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk the open market operations of the central bank
necessary to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation combine the elements from the
two cases alone. At date 0 the government imposes a lump sum tax of 0 and gives it to the
central bank. The central bank uses it to fund a portfolio of the short asset. At date 1 in
state  = 0 the central bank fixes the price of the long asset at 0 = 1 by removing liquidity
from the market. In order to do this it uses government securities that pay  at date 2 and
sells them at 0 = 1 The quantity of government securities issued at date 1 is denoted 1 
In order to ensure the price of the long asset can be successfully fixed, it is necessary that

0 + 1 = 1 ∗ − 0 ∗ = ∗ 

(14)

This ensures that all of the excess liquidity is drained from the banks into the central bank
and there is no pressure to push up 0 in state  = 0.
The date 2 interest paid on the securities issued at date 1 is paid from the short asset
held by the central bank. If any is left over then this is paid out as a lump sum grant to
late consumers. If the resources of the central bank are insuﬃcient then the shortfall is
covered by a lump sum tax. In state  = 1 the central bank needs to supply liquidity to the
market because there is just enough liquidity in the financial system  ∗ = 1 ∗ to satisfy the
aggregate demand in state  = 1 If the central bank did not release this liquidity the banks
would not have enough to satisfy the early consumers’ demands. It does this by using the
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short asset it holds to buy the long asset. This enables it to fix the price at 1 = 1
We next determine the choice of 0 and 1 and the banks’ portfolio that implements
the constrained eﬃcient allocation. At date 0 after the lump sum tax of 0 the depositors
have 1 − 0 remaining and they deposit this in the banks. The banks choose a portfolio of
 ∗ − 0 in the short asset and 1 −  ∗ in the long asset.
At date 1 in state  = 0 the  banks need liquidity 0 ∗ to satisfy the demands of their
early consumers. They have  ∗ − 0  They therefore sell 0 ∗ − ( ∗ − 0 ) of the long asset.
(Note that if 0 ∗  ( ∗ − 0 ), they are buying the long asset, the total supply of which
includes that issued by the central bank.) The amount of the long asset they have remaining
is 1 −  ∗ − [0 ∗ − ( ∗ − 0 )] = 1 − 0 ∗ − 0  At date 2 they are able to use the payoﬀs
of these long term assets to give each of their 1 − 0 late consumers to provide a payout of
 20 =

(1 − 0 ∗ − 0 )

1 − 0

In addition to this payoﬀ from their bank the late consumers receive a lump sum grant
(or tax) from the government. The central bank has 0 in cash from date 0 As explained
above, at date 1 they issue 1 = ∗ − 0 of securities that pay  at date 2 Thus at date 2
the total amount owed in interest is 1  = (∗ −0 ) The central bank holds the proceeds
of the debt issue 1 = ∗ − 0 in the short asset. In total they have 0 + ∗ − 0 = ∗
of the short asset. This allows a lump sum grant to each of the 1 − 0 late consumers of
 20 =

∗ − (∗ − 0 )
0  − ∗ ( − 1)
=

1 − 0
1 − 0

The amount received by each of the late consumers in the  =   banks equals then
 20 +  20 . In order to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation, it is necessary that this
is equal to the constrained eﬃcient allocation ∗20 so using (12) we have

 20 +  20 =

(1 − 0 ∗ − 0 ) 0  − ∗ ( − 1)
∗ + (1 −  ∗ )
+
= ∗20 =

1 − 0
1 − 0
1 − 0
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(15)

As with just idiosyncratic risk it can be seen that 0 = 1 − ∗ allows both  and 
banks to implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
It remains to show that 0 = 1 − ∗ allows the banks to ensure early consumers receive
∗ and late consumers receive ∗21 in state  = 1 Similarly to (15) it can be shown that late
consumers receive
 21 +  21 =

(1 − 1 ∗ − 0 )
0 
+

1 − 1
1 − 1

(16)

The main diﬀerence here is in last term, which is the lump sum grant. As explained above,
in state  = 1 the central bank at date 1 uses the short term asset to purchase 0 of the
long asset. This pays oﬀ a total of 0  at date 2 to be distributed among the 1 − 1 late
consumers.
Again substituting 0 = 1 − ∗ and using  ∗ = 1 ∗ it follows that
 21 +  21 =

(1 −  ∗ )
= ∗21 
1 − 1

Thus the central bank policy described allows banks to implement the constrained eﬃcient
allocation. Each bank’s optimization problem is again satisfied.
Just as in Section 4, if aggregate uncertainty is suﬃciently large relative to idiosyncratic
uncertainty the banks will stop trading with each other in state  = 0 As there, the condition
is that 1   0  or equivalently    The diﬀerence here is that the  banks continue
to trade with the central bank. The central bank sells long securities to the banks but that
is the only trade that takes place. Since now these allocations where banks do not trade
with each other in the interbank market are constrained eﬃcient they cannot be improved
on. Thus the observation that banks stop lending to each other does not necessarily mean
there is a market failure or ineﬃciency.
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6

Complete markets

In the model analyzed so far, markets are incomplete because it is not possible to hedge
aggregate or idiosyncratic liquidity risk. In this section we consider the allocation that would
occur with complete markets where liquidity risk can be hedged. This version of the model
is a special case of that considered in Allen and Gale (2004a). They show that with complete
markets and incomplete contracts of the type considered here the allocation is constrained
eﬃcient. In other words, a planner subject to the constraint of using a fixed payment in the
first period cannot improve upon the complete markets allocation. Institutionally there are
a number of ways that complete markets can be implemented. We focus on the simplest
institutional structure where all trades occur at date 0. Other possibilities are discussed
briefly at the end of the section.
Initially we will focus on aggregate risk and will introduce idiosyncratic risk at a later
stage. For the moment, 0 = ̄ and 1 = ̄ + 
So far we have assumed that assets are held by the bank. Since the assets are produced
with constant returns to scale, with complete markets there will be zero profits associated
with producing them. Therefore it does not matter which agents hold them. Let’s suppose
initially firms hold the assets and issue securities against them. Banks use the funds from
deposits to buy these securities. We will model these securities in the form of Arrow securities
where each security pays oﬀ 1 in a particular state and nothing in any of the other states.
All of these Arrow securities are traded at date 0.
There are five aggregate states in total. At date 0 there is one state. There are two
states  = 0 1 at the two subsequent dates  = 1 2 to give four further states ( ) for a
total of five We take consumption at date 0 as the numeraire with the price of the Arrow
security paying oﬀ 1 unit of consumption in that state normalized at 1 The prices of the
Arrow securities that pay oﬀ in the other states ( ) are denoted  .
We can represent the short assets and the long asset by their payoﬀs in the five states
(0 10 11 20 21) as follows:
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Asset

Payoﬀs

Zero-profit condition

Short asset from date 0 to 1

(−1 1 1 0 0) −1 + 10 + 11 ≤ 0

"

"

"

" 1 to 2 in state  = 0 (0 −1 0 1 0) −10 + 20 ≤ 0

"

"

"

" 1 to 2 in state  = 1 (0 0 −1 0 1) −11 + 21 ≤ 0
(−1 0 0 1 1) −1 + 20  + 21  ≤ 0

Long asset from date 0 to 2

If the zero profit condition is satisfied with an equality the asset is produced. If it is
satisfied with a strict inequality it is not produced. To implement the constrained eﬃcient
allocation we have

−1 + 10 + 11 = 0; −10 + 20 = 0; −11 + 21  0; −1 + 20  + 21  = 0
The problem of the representative bank is to use the Arrow security markets at date 0
to purchase the units of consumption to maximize its depositors’ expected utility. The total
amount of consumption it purchases is   at date 1 and (1 −  )2 at date 2 for  = 0 1
The bank chooses  20  and 21 to
max  [0 () + (1 − 0 )(20 )] + (1 − ) [1 () + (1 − 1 )(21 )]
s.t.

10 0  + 20 (1 − 0 )20 + 11 1  + 21 (1 − 1 )21 = 1

(17)

0 ≤  20  21 
The first line is depositors’ expected utility. The second is the budget constraint in the date
0 markets. There is a single budget constraint because all transactions take place at date 0.
The third line has the usual non-negativity constraints.
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint , the first order conditions
for the choice of  20  and 21 are:
0 0 () + (1 − )1 0 () + (10 0 + 11 1 ) = 0
0 (20 ) + 20 = 0
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(1 − )0 (21 ) + 21 = 0
Substituting the constrained eﬃcient values of  20  and 21 into these, and using the
budget constraint and the zero profit conditions, it is possible to derive the prices that
implement the constrained eﬃcient allocation. These prices allow the firms to produce the
assets at zero profits, and the banks to maximize depositors’ welfare.
So far we have abstracted from idiosyncratic risk. We next consider how this can be
accommodated. Suppose each firm issues state-contingent Arrow securities based on the
shock  and  experienced by the purchasing bank. They issue these securities in small
amounts to all other banks so that the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away. Each bank will
buy enough of the  and  securities to cover their needs in each of the states. As usual we
denote  =  +  for  = 0 1 and  =   The Arrow securities each bank buys are  
at date 1 and (1 −  )2 at date 2 for  = 0 1 and  =   The price of these securities
are  for  = 1 2  = 0 1 and  =  
In order for the banks to be able to aﬀord the optimal state contingent securities it is
necessary that
  +   =   for  = 1 2 and  = 0 1
Since the aggregate state ( ) is the same for each  and , and
1
2

1
2

of the banks are  and

are  consider the symmetric equilibrium with
1
 =  =  
2
This ensures that the banks can aﬀord to purchase the constrained eﬃcient allocation.

Since this gives the highest expected utility for the depositors, it is the best that the banks
can do.
In the case of incomplete markets, the banks held the assets. With complete markets
we have, for simplicity, been assuming that firms hold the assets and issue the securities.
Since there are zero profits from producing the assets we could just as well assume that the
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banks held the assets. In order to obtain the benefits of diversification, they would issue
securities against the assets in the same way as the firms. They would also buy them in the
same way as previously. Thus they would be on both sides of the market buying and selling
large numbers of securities. Essentially each bank is issuing to and holding the securities
of every other bank. Since issuing securities and maintaining the accounting and other
infrastructure associated with them is costly, it would be impractical to implement this kind
of arrangement. This is why the role of the central bank in implementing the constrained
eﬃcient allocation is so important.
The institutional structure where all trades take place at date 0 described above is only
one institutional structure that will implement complete markets. Another structure is to
have dynamic markets where firms issue state contingent Arrow securities between dates 0
and 1 that are contingent on the state  = 0 1 and allow the banks to hedge this risk. At
date 1, there are markets for date 2 consumption that the banks and firms can also trade
in. However, this case also requires a large number of markets and securities to allow the
idiosyncratic risk to be diversified away.

7

The multi-period case

In this section we extend the results of the simple, two-period model to an economy with
a countably infinite number of dates, indexed by  = 0 1 . We continue to assume that
agents have one unit of the good at date 0 and nothing at dates   0. Agents only value
consumption at a single date  = 1 2 . At the initial date, all agents are identical. At
each subsequent date , a fraction of the agents receives a liquidity shock that makes them
want to consume at that date. The agents who receive the liquidity shock consume what
they can and leave the market. The liquidity shock has a constant hazard ̄ ∈ [0 1]. In
other words, a consumer receives a liquidity shock with probability ̄ at date  if he has
not received one previously. Then the probability that an agent does not receive a liquidity
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¡
¢−1
shock before date  is 1 − ̄
and the probability that he receives the liquidity shock at
¡
¢−1
̄.
date  is 1 − ̄

We assume that the fraction of agents receiving the shock is equal to the hazard rate ̄
¡
¢−1
agents left in the market
in each period. So at the beginning of date , there are 1 − ̄

and, of these, a fraction ̄ receive the liquidity shock. So the number who want to consume
¡
¢−1
̄.
at date  is also 1 − ̄

There is an infinite number of long assets, one corresponding to each date  = 1 2 .

One unit of the good invested in asset  ≥ 1 produces  units of the good at date  and
nothing at other dates. Investment is irreversible, so once the investment is made it is
impossible to obtain any consumption from this asset before date . We assume that the
returns per period on investment in the long asset is a constant   1. There is also a short
asset, represented by a storage technology, that can be used at any date, but since there is
no aggregate uncertainty (the hazard rate ̄ is a constant), the short asset will always be
dominated by one of the long assets.

7.1

The planner’s problem

A planner who wants to maximize the value of the typical agent’s expected utility will choose
a sequence of consumption levels c = { }∞
=1 to maximize
∞
X
¡
¢−1
̄ ( )
1 − ̄
=1

subject to a feasibility constraint
∞
X
¢−1
1 ¡
1
−
̄
̄ ≤ 1


=1

In deriving the feasibility constraint, we make use of the fact that the most eﬃcient way of
providing consumption at date  is to invest in the long asset corresponding to date . The
¡
¢−1
̄ , since each agent receives
total amount of consumption provided at date  is 1 − ̄
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¡
¢−1
̄ agents who want to consume at date . To provide one unit
 and there are 1 − ̄
1


units of investment at date 0, so the total investment
¡
¢−1
̄ .
required at date 0 to provide consumption at date  is 1 1 − ̄

of consumption at date  requires

Under the usual assumptions on  (·), there is a unique solution c∗ = {∗ } to the planner’s

problem and it satisfies ∗  0 for every  ≥ 1. The solution is determined by the first-order
conditions
0 (∗ ) =





∀ = 1 2 

where   0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint, and by the feasibility
constraint
∞
X
¢−1 ∗
1 ¡
̄ = 1
1 − ̄


=1

Note that the first-order conditions imply that ∗+1  ∗ for every  ≥ 1, so the incentive
compatibility condition is automatically satisfied at each date.
Example 1 To illustrate the planner’s solution, suppose that the utility function  (·) has
constant relative risk aversion   1. Then the first-order condition is
(∗ )− =





(18)

which implies
1
∗+1

=

∗

The present value of consumption at date  is

∗


is declining over time: since   1,

∗+1 1
∗+1
∗
=


1


+1
 
As we shall see this turns out to be an obstacle to the decentralization of the optimal allocation in a laisser faire system.
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7.2

The banking system

Now let us consider the problem of implementing the optimal allocation when individual
banks receive idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. There is a continuum of banks identified with
points in [0 1]. At any date  ≥ 1, bank  receives a liquidity shock  , where  denotes the
fraction of depositors remaining who want to consume in period . We assume the random
variables { }∞
=1 are i.i.d. with c.d.f.  () and that  () satisfies
Z

1

 () = ̄

0

We assume the “law of large numbers” convention is satisfied, so that the average liquidity
shock across all banks  is equal to ̄ at each date :
Z

1

∀ = 1 2 

  = ̄

0

Although there is no aggregate uncertainty–the fraction of the remaining depositors that
want to withdraw in each period is equal to the constant ̄–the amount of withdrawals at
bank  is uncertain. We can assume without loss of generality that bank  starts out with
a unit mass of identical depositors. At date 1, a fraction 1 withdraw, leaving (1 − 1 )
agents as depositors. At date 2, a fraction 2 of these depositors, i.e., (1 − 1 ) 2 , choose
to withdraw, leaving (1 − 1 ) (1 − 2 ) agents as depositors. So at the beginning of date
Q
, the number depositors is −1
 =1 (1 −  ) and the number of withdrawing depositors is
Q−1
 =1 (1 −  )  .
Example 2 Now we can see why a decentralized banking system might have diﬃculty implementing the optimal allocation. Consider the example with constant relative risk aversion
  1 and suppose that each bank promises the depositors ∗ if they withdraw at date . Since
each depositor who withdraws at date  receives more in present value than the depositors
who withdraw later, a bank with   ̄ would have to pay out more than a bank with   ̄.
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So banks that get hit with high withdrawals early on will not be able to meet their customers’
demands later on.
To illustrate how the interbank market and open market operations can help banks
implement the optimal allocation, we consider first a rather special policy for implementing
the optimal allocation. Later we show that there are many policies that will achieve the
same end.
Bank ’s deposit contract promises the individual depositors ∗ if withdrawal occurs at
date  ≥ 1. Suppose that bank ’s portfolio is the same as the planner’s. If ∗ denotes the
investment in the asset that pays oﬀ at date , then

∗ =

¢−1 ∗
1 ¡
1
−
̄
̄ 


∀ = 1 2 

In other words, the amount invested in the asset that pays oﬀ at date  is suﬃcient to provide
P
∗
the consumption at date  in the optimal allocation. By assumption, ∞
=1  = 1, so the

bank’s budget constraint at date 0 is satisfied.

At each date  ≥ 1 there is a market in which the long assets can be traded. The central
bank ensures that at each date  ≥ 1, all the remaining assets sell for the same price
 =  

∀ = 1 2 

Given this pricing rule, the one-period holding return on every asset is  and banks will be
indiﬀerent between holding assets of diﬀerent maturities at every date.
The main problem of decentralizing the optimal consumption allocation arises because
banks receive diﬀerent liquidity shocks and this may make it impossible for some banks to
meet their commitments to depositors and satisfy their budget constraints. One way to
ensure that the banks can do both is to set the contractual payment ∗ equal to an amount
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that has a constant present value. In the present case, that requires

∗ =  

∀ = 1 2 

Then the bank’s budget constraint is independent of the realization of { }∞
=1 since each
cohort withdraws the same amount in present value. This strategy will not guarantee that
agents receive the optimal consumption allocation unless the government steps in to adjust
their income by means of lump sum taxes and transfers. It it turns out that the government
can do this while balancing its own budget.
It remains to show that there is a government policy that will implement the optimal consumption allocation, given the bank’s choice of deposit contract and portfolio. By imposing
the tax-transfer scheme s∗ = {∗ }∞
=1 satisfying
∗ + ∗ = ∗ 

∀ = 1 2 

the government can ensure that each consumer receives ∗ if he withdraws at date .
The tax-transfer scheme ensures that the consumers receive the optimal amount of consumption at each date, but the government needs a source of income to pay for the transfers
or a way of redistributing the taxes. We assume that the government can issue one-period
bonds at each date. Then the budget constraint can be balanced in each period by issuing or
retiring debt. In equilibrium, the return on government bonds must equal the return on long
assets, . At the first date, the government gives 0∗ bonds to each bank. Let ∗ denote
the per capita value of the bonds issued at date  ≥ 1. The government’s budget constraint
at date  + 1, expressed in per capita terms, is
¡
¢−1 ∗
∗
̄ 
− ∗ = 1 − ̄
−1

∀ = 1 2 

∗
is the cost of redeeming the old bonds, ∗ is the revenue from issuing new
where −1
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¡
¢−1 ∗
̄ is the cost of the tax-transfer to the current consumers. We
bonds, and 1 − ̄

assume that ∗ ≥ 0 for any  = 0, and choose 0∗ large enough so that this condition can be
satisfied.
Example 3 We can illustrate the debt policy using our example of constant relative risk
aversion   1. We start with a high present value of consumption

∗1


 1, which requires

∗1 = ∗1 −   0. So the government has to raise revenue by issuing debt. Suppose that we
put 0∗ = 0 and set 1∗ = ̄1 . In subsequent periods, the present value of consumption falls
but as long as

∗


 1, we have ∗ = ∗ −   0 and the government needs revenues in order

to pay for the transfers. So at each date  such that

∗


≥ 1, the debt must be increased.

Eventually, we reach a date  such that ∗ = ∗ −   0. At that point, the government begins to tax the consumers and retire the debt. At subsequent dates, as the present
value of consumption continues to fall, the government can retire debt at an accelerating pace.

It remains to check the market-clearing conditions at each date. The goods market clears
because the final demand for consumption comes entirely from consumers and their demand
is equal to the supply of goods in each period,
¢−1 ∗
¡
̄ =  ∗ 
1 − ̄
The securities markets clear by Walras’ law. To see this, note that the net demand for assets
∗
minus the
from the private sector banks is equal to the total supply of liquidity  ∗ +−1
¡
¢−1
deposits paid out to consumers 1 − ̄
̄ . The net supply of bonds is ∗ , so demand

equals supply if

or

¡
¢−1
∗
̄ = ∗ 
− 1 − ̄
 ∗ + −1
¡
¢−1
∗
−1
− ∗ = 1 − ̄
̄ −  ∗ 
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¡
¢−1 ∗
̄ . From
From the government’s budget constraint the left hand side is equal to 1 − ̄
the market-clearing condition for the goods market and the definition of the deposit contract,

the right hand side can be rewritten as
¡
¢−1 ∗ ¡
¢−1 ∗
¡
¢−1
̄ −  ∗ = 1 − ̄
̄ − 1 − ̄
̄
1 − ̄
¡
¢−1 ∗
= 1 − ̄
̄ 
as required.
We can show that the deposit contract d∗ = {∗ }∞
=1 maximizes the expected utility of
the bank’s depositors subject to the bank’s budget constraint by checking the first-order
conditions, so the contract is optimal for a competitive bank.

7.3

Alternative schemes

The construction used above is just one of many. There is a Modigliani-Miller theorem that
allows the bank to oﬀer diﬀerent deposit contracts if the government adjusts its debt policy
appropriately.
Suppose that we set
∗ = ∗ 

∀ = 1 2 

and leave the specification of the variables (∗  ∗ ) and ∗ unchanged. Is there a debt policy
{ }∞
=0 that will satisfy both the government’s and the banks’ budget constraints? From
the point of view of the individual bank, the important thing is to remove the capital gains
and losses caused by the liquidity shocks, in other words, to keep constant the assets per
depositor held by the bank.
If 0 is the quantity of bonds (positive or negative) given to banks initially, then the
value of assets per capita at the end of date  = 1 is

∗1 =

 (1 + 0 ) − 1 ∗1

1 − 1
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The quantity ∗1 is independent of the idiosyncratic shock 1 if and only if
 (1 + 0 ) = ∗1 

Similarly, at any date , the value of assets per capita at the end of the period will be

∗ =

 (1 + −1 ) −  ∗

1 − 

which is independent of  if and only if  (1 + −1 ) = ∗ . This suggests that we define the
sequence ∗ by putting
∗ =

∗+1 − 



∀ = 0 1 

It remains to explain how the budget constraints will be satisfied.
The government must impose lump sum taxes equal to the diﬀerence between the cost
of retiring the old debt and the new debt issued in each period. That is,
¡
¢−1 ∗
∗
− 1 − ̄
̄ = −1
− ∗ 

∀ = 0 1 

This tax can be imposed on the remaining depositors at the end of period . Since the
depositors have no cash (and the deposit contract gives them none), it would be easiest to
levy this as a tax on deposits. If the government’s budget constraint is balanced, the banks’
budget constraints must be balanced as well.
It remains to check that the market-clearing conditions are satisfied as well. At date 0,
the government makes an ex gratia payment of bonds to the banks. This does not disturb
the goods market. Next consider what happens at date 1. The government owes the banks
0∗ . It gives them 1∗ and levies taxes totalling −̄∗1 = 0∗ − 1∗ , which discharges its
obligations to the banks exactly, again without disturbing the goods market. The same
argument shows that the goods market is not disturbed at any future date  and, since all
assets bear the same return , the banks are willing to hold all the assets oﬀered to it.
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Concluding remarks

This paper has developed a simple model of the interbank market.

We have shown how

central bank intervention in this market can improve welfare in a variety of situations.
The model is very simple. However, it can be extended in a number of directions to
consider important issues. We have so far ignored bankruptcy of financial institutions. This
will likely occur if the high liquidity demand crisis state occurs with small enough probability.
Incorporating this will allow open market operations to be compared with lender of last resort
policies.
The model is a real one in that all the funds of the bank that are used for intervention
are raised through lump sum taxes. If the bank uses seigniorage instead then this should
allow some insight into the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability.
For reasons of tractability we have only considered the multi-period version of the model
with idiosyncratic risk. The term premium in this case is exogenously determined by the
technological returns of the assets. If aggregate liquidity risk is introduced into the model,
the short asset may be used and this may lead to a spike in the liquidity term premium
in the high liquidity demand state similarly to the two-period model above. The approach
therefore has the potential to explain the kind of liquidity term premium that appears to be
emblematic of the credit crisis that started in the summer of 2007.
Finally, we have only considered open market operations by the central bank in the
interbank market. Another possibility would be for the central bank to pay banks interest
on funds deposited with them as suggested by Goodfriend (2002). Considering this policy
in the context of our model would be an interesting extension.
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